General Chairs

• Aris Filos-Ratsikas, University of Edinburgh
• Yiannis Giannakopoulos, University of Glasgow

Contact:PLEASE GO AWAY! general-chairs@wine2024.org

Program Committee Chairs

• Marios Mavronicolas, University of Cyprus
• Qi Qi, Renmin University of China
• Grant Schoenebeck, University of Michigan

Contact:PLEASE GO AWAY! program-chairs@wine2024.org

Senior Program Committee

• Xiaohui Bei, NTU
• Vittorio Bilò, University of Salento
• Simina Branzei, Purdue University
• Zhigang Cao, Beijing Jiaotong University
• Jing Chen, Tsinghua University
• Xujin Chen, UMass
• George Christodoulou, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki
• Federico Echenique , UC Berkeley
• Edith Elkind, University of Oxford
• Angelo Fanelli, CNRS
• Qizhi Fang, Ocean University of China
• Hu Fu, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
• Jie Gao, Rutgers University
• Jugal Garg, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
• Vasilis Gkatzelis, Drexel University
• Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen, Aarhus University
• Martin Hoefer, Goethe University Frankfurt/Main
• Zhiyi Huang, Hong Kong University
• Christos Kaklamanis, University of Patras and CTI "Diophantus"
• David Kempe, University of Southern California
• Max Klimm, Technische Universität Berlin
• Yuqing Kong, Peking University
• Bo Li, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University
• Minming Li, City University of Hong Kong
• Xiao Liu, Tsinghua University
• Brendan Lucier, Microsoft Research New England
• Gianpiero Monaco, University of Chieti
• Rad Niazadeh, University of Chicago
• Sigal Oren, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
• Vijay G. Subramanian, University of Michigan
• Biaoshuai Tao, Shanghai Jiao Tong University
• Alexandros Voudouris, Essex University
• Xintong Wang, Rutgers University
• Zihe Wang, Renmin University
• Lirong Xia, Rutgers University
• Fang-Yi Yu, George Mason University
• Dengji Zhao, Shenghai Tech

Program Committee

• Yeganeh Alimohammadi, Stanford University
• Elliot Anshelevich, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
• Georgios Birmpas, University of Liverpool
• Farzad Bourbabaee, California Institute of Technology
• Johannes Brustle, London School of Economics
• Martin Bullinger, Technical University of Munich
• Costas Busch, Augusta University
• Linda Cai, Princeton University
• Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
• Yilun Chen, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen
• Zhou Chen, Hangzhou City University
• Yukun Cheng, Jiangnan University
• Yun Kuen (Marco) Cheung, Australian National University
• Sulagna Dasgupta, University of Chicago
• Bart De Keijzer, King's College London
• David Delacretaz, University of Manchester
• Argyrios Deligkas, Royal Holloway London
• Battal Dogan, University of Bristol
• Umut Dur, North Carolina State University
• Marcin Konrad Dziubiński, University of Warsaw
• Tomer Ezra, Harvard University
• Michail Fasoulakis, Foundation for Research and Technology - Hellas
• Zhixuan Fang, Tsinghua University
• Maximilian Fichtl, Technical University Munich
• Yiding Feng, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
• Jessica Finocchiaro, Boston College
• Bailey Flanigan, Carnegie Mellon University
• Federico Fusco, Sapienza University of Rome
• Yotam Gafni, Weizmann Institute of Science
• Ling Gai, Shanghai University of Science and Technology
• Ganesh Ghalme, Indian Institute of Technology Hyderabad
• Sumit Goel, New York University
• Michael L. Hamilton, University of Pittsburgh
• Dong Hao, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China
• Tobias Harks, University of Passau
• Kun He, Renmin University of China
• Alexandros Hollender, University of Oxford
• Anson Kahng, University of Rochester
• Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, University of Essex
• Gregory Kehne, University of Texas at Austin
• Zhonghong Kuang, Renmin University of China
• Rucha Kulkarni, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
• Jiangtao Li, Singapore Management University
• Mengling Li, Xiamen University
• Weian Li, Shandong University
• Yingkai Li, National University of Singapore
• Shengxin Liu, Harbin Institute of Technology
• Zhengyang Liu, Beijing Institute of Technology
• Jiaqi Lu, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen
• Junjie Luo, Beijing Jiaotong University
• Hongtao Lv, Shandong University
• Simon Mauras, INRIA
• Divyarthi Mohan, Tel-Aviv University
• Vishnu V. Narayan, Tel Aviv University
• Lata Narayanan, Concordia University
• Thanh Nguyen, Purdue University
• Dario Paccagnan, Imperial College London
• Ioannis Panageas, UC Irvine
• Maneesha Papireddygari, University of Colorado at Boulder
• Rojin Rezvan, University of Texas at Austin
• Daniel Schmand, University of Bremen
• Daniel Schoepflin, Drexel University
• Alkmini Sgouritsa, Athens University of Economics and Business
• Weiran Shen, Renmin University of China
• Yangguang Shi, Shandong University
• Nian Si, The Hong Kong University of Science and Techology
• Samuel Taggart, Oberlin College
• Yixin Tao, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
• Yifeng Teng, Google
• Nikolas Tsakas, University of Cyprus
• Artem Tsikiridis, Centrum voor Wiscunde en Informatica
• Bertan Turhan, Iowa State University
• Cosimo Vinci, University of Salento
• Changjun Wang, Chinese Academy of Sciences
• Kangning Wang, Rutgers University
• Zizhuo Wang, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen
• Xiaowei Wu, University of Macau
• Zenan Wu, Peking University
• Dimitrios Xefteris, University of Cyprus
• Tao Xiao, Huawei Technologies Ltd.
• Xiang Yan, Huawei Technologies Ltd.
• Yanqing Yang, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications
• Kanye Ye WANG, University of Macau
• Yuan Yuan, Purdue University
• Haifeng Zhang, Chinese Academy of Sciences
• Hanrui Zhang, Google Research
• Jinshan Zhang, Zhejiang University
• Meng Zhang, Northwestern University
• Qiankun Zhang, Huazhong University of Science and Technology
• Yichi Zhang, University of Michigan
• Jingtong Zhao, Renmin University of China
• Junyao Zhao, Stanford University
• Shuran Zheng, Tsinghua University
• Juba Ziani, Georgia Institute of Tecnology

Steering Committee

• Xiaotie Deng, Peking University, China
• Paul Goldberg, University of Oxford, UK
• Christos Papadimitriou, Columbia University, USA
• Paul Spirakis, University of Liverpool, UK
• Rakesh Vohra, University of Pennsylvania, USA
• Andrew Yao, Tsinghua University, China
• Yinyu Ye, Stanford University, USA
• Nicole Immorlica, Microsoft Research Lab, USA (joint ACM-EC/WINE executive committee)
• Scott Kominers, Harvard University, USA (joint ACM-EC/WINE executive committee)
• Katrina Ligett, Hebrew University, Israel (joint ACM-EC/WINE executive committee)

Call for Papers

Over the past two decades, researchers in theoretical computer science, artificial intelligence, operations research, and economics have joined forces to understand the interplay of incentives and computation. These issues are of particular importance for the Internet, enabling the interaction of large and diverse populations. The Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE) is an interdisciplinary forum for exchanging ideas and results on incentives and computation arising from these various fields. WINE 2024 continues the successful tradition of the Conference on Web and Internet Economics (named Workshop on Internet & Network Economics until 2013), held annually from 2005 to the present.

WINE 2024 is planned as an in-person event from December 2 to December 5, 2024, hosted by the School of Informatics, University of Edinburgh.

The program will feature invited talks, tutorials, and paper presentations. All paper submissions will be peer-reviewed and evaluated based on the quality of their contribution, originality, soundness, and significance. Submissions about Web and Internet Economics are invited in, but not limited to, the following topics:

• Auctions and pricing
• Behavioral economics and behavioral modeling
• Blockchains and their applications
• Computational advertising
• Computational aspects of equilibria
• Computational social choice
• Coalitions, coordination, and collective action
• Decision theory
• Econometrics, ML and Data Science
• Economic and strategic aspects of machine learning models
• Fair division
• Information design including contest and contract design
• Information elicitation
• Learning in games and markets
• Market design
• Matching markets
• Mechanism design
• Network games
• Online platforms and applications
• Privacy, fairness, and security
• Revenue management
• Social networks

Papers deemed to be outside the scope of the WINE conference and/or not of sufficient interest to the WINE community will be desk-rejected.

Important Dates

Paper submission deadline: July 15, 2024, AoE

Author notification: On or before September 16, 2024

Camera-ready deadline: October 8, 2024 

Invited Talks

The program will feature three keynote talks; the keynote speakers and the topics of their talks will be announced soon.

Submission Server

OpenReview: https://openreview.net/group?id=WINE/2024/Conference

Please note OpenReview's moderation policy for newly created profiles:

• New profiles created without an institutional email will go through a moderation process that can take up to two weeks.
• New profiles created with an institutional email will be activated automatically.

Submission Format

Authors are invited to submit papers presenting original research on any research topic related to WINE 2024. 

Submissions must be anonymous (see below). A submission should start with the title of the paper followed by a brief summary of the paper’s contributions. This should then be followed by a technical exposition of the main ideas and techniques used to achieve these results, including motivation and a clear comparison with related work. Even if the authors choose to publish a one-page abstract, the submission of the complete paper is necessary to facilitate a comprehensive and rigorous review process.

The submission should not exceed 12 single-spaced pages (excluding references) using reasonable margins (at least one-inch margins all around) and at least 11-points font. If the authors believe that more details are essential to substantiate the claims of the paper, they may include a clearly marked appendix (with no space limit) that will be read at the discretion of the Program Committee. It is strongly recommended that submissions adhere to the specified format and length. Submissions that are clearly too long may be desk-rejected. The above specifications are meant to provide more freedom to the authors at the time of submission. Note that accepted papers will be allocated 18 pages (including references) in the LNCS format in the proceedings (see below).

The proceedings of the conference will be published by Springer-Verlag in the ARCoSS/LNCS series, and will be available for distribution at the conference. Accepted papers will be allocated 18 pages total in the LNCS format in the proceedings. Submissions are encouraged, though not required, to follow the LNCS format (Latex, Word). More information about the LNCS format can be found on the author instructions page of Springer-Verlag.

WINE 2024 will use double-blind reviewing like all other major conferences. Submissions should not reveal the identity of the authors in any way. In particular, authors’ names, affiliations, and email addresses should not appear anywhere in the submission. (In LNCS \author{} and \institute{} fields should not be included.) Authors should refer to their prior work in a neutral manner (i.e., instead of saying “We showed …” say “XYZ et al. showed”). It is acceptable to submit work that has been presented in public (provided there are no published proceedings) or has been uploaded to arXiv or similar online archives, provided the submission itself is anonymized.

Questions regarding the submissions can be directed to the PC Co-Chairs at program-chairs@wine2024.org 

Program Committee and Senior Program Committee

See here.

Conflict of Interest Policy

A conflict of interest (COI) is limited to the following categories:

1. Family member or close friend.
2. Ph.D. advisor or advisee (no time limit), or postdoctoral or undergraduate mentor or mentee within the past five years.
3. Person with the same affiliation.
4. Involved in an alleged incident of harassment (it is not required that the incident be reported).
5. Reviewer owes the author a favor (e.g., recently requested a reference letter).
6. Frequent or recent collaborator whom you believe cannot objectively review your work.

 

Authors will have the opportunity to declare COIs with (Senior) Program Committee members. This must be done separately for each submission. Declaring COIs prevents the specified person from reviewing a paper, thereby constraining the matching process and potentially negatively impacting review quality. For this reason, COIs should not be declared automatically based on a prior relationship (e.g., coauthor, friend, colleague in the same institution, etc.). (Senior) Program Committee members can also declare a COI with authors as well as with specific papers. Authors are kindly asked to verify that their Open Review profiles are up-to-date with respect to relations and conflicts. 

Policy Against Plagiarism

WINE 2024 adopts the official ACM policy against plagiarism.

Best Paper Award

A best paper award and a best student paper award will be given. The awarded papers will be chosen among those that appear in full length (18 pages) in the proceedings.

Important Notice

To accommodate the publishing traditions of different fields, authors of accepted papers can ask that only a one-page abstract of the paper appear in the proceedings, along with a URL pointing to the full paper. The authors should guarantee the link to be reliable for at least two years. This option is available to accommodate subsequent publication in journals that would not consider results that have been published in preliminary form in conference proceedings. Such papers must be submitted and formatted just like papers submitted for full-text publication. Simultaneous submission of results to another conference with published proceedings is not allowed. Results previously published or presented at another archival conference prior to WINE 2024, or published (or accepted for publication) at a journal prior to the submission deadline of WINE 2024, will not be considered. Simultaneous submission of results to a journal is allowed only if the authors intend to publish the paper as a one-page abstract in WINE 2024. Papers that are accepted and appear as a one-page abstract can be subsequently submitted for publication in a journal but may not be submitted to any other conference that has a published proceeding.

Forward to Journal

Upon submission, WINE authors would have a chance to select at most one from the following journals:

• Management Science, Revenue Management and Market Analytics area
• Operations Research, Revenue Management and Market Analytics area
• Games and Economic Behavior
• Social Choice and Welfare
• ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
• Artificial Intelligence
• Theoretical Economics

How does it work? If the authors of a paper accepted to WINE 2024 plan to use the Forward-to-Journal option, they must submit a one-page extended abstract by the deadline for the camera-ready version of the conference proceedings. The authors then have the option of submitting their journal paper by January 22, 2025, to the journal they have selected. The cover letter to the journal should specify that the submission is part of the WINE 2024 Forward-to-Journal process. The authors should also include a formal response document to the WINE 2024 conference reviews and explain how those were addressed in the revised manuscript. In case the particular journal of choice needs to have a de-anonymized version of the conference reviews on the submission, WINE 2024 will provide them upon request by the journal. Note that a journal's participation in the WINE 2024 Forward-to-Journal option does not mean that other forms of previous publication of the submission are acceptable for the journal.

What are the implications? The journal's department editor and/or associate editor can use the conference reviews to guide the decision-making process in whatever way the journal finds appropriate. We suspect the AEs might choose referees from among the set of conference reviewers, especially if they found the conference reviews informative. We would like to emphasize, however, that the conference reviewers are not required to accept such review requests. Furthermore, journals are not required to accept these papers (and may even choose to desk-reject them depending on fit).

Registration

Note: At least one author from each accepted paper must complete a (regular or student, depending on their academic status) registration to attend the conference!

Cost

• Registration fees include: participation in the main conferece (3-5 December) and tutorial day (2 December); lunch and coffee breaks; reception on 2 December; dinner on 4 December.

	Early registration	Late registration
Regular	£370	£450
Student	£310	£400

• Extra dinner tickets for guests can be purchased, during online registration, for an additional fee of £40.

Important Dates

• Early (online) registration will be available until 1 November, 2024.
• Late (online) resigration fees will be in effect between 2 November - 1 December, 2024.
• Starting December 2, only onsite registration will be available, for a fee of £550.

Call for Tutorials

WINE 2024 will feature tutorials, designed to highlight emerging topics.

Format

WINE 2024 will host only in-person tutorial sessions, held as one-day events on December 2, 2024. Each tutorial session will be scheduled for a 2-hour time slot.

Submission Information

Tutorial proposals should ideally be one page in length and include the following:

• Title of the tutorial
• Names, affiliations, and email addresses of the organizers
• A brief abstract of the tutorial
• A short outline of the tutorial content

Tutorial proposals should be emailed to: program-chairs@wine2024.org

Important Dates

• September 21, 2024: Deadline for submitting tutorial proposals
• October 1, 2024: Accept/reject notifications for tutorial proposal
• December 2, 2024: Tutorial day

Tutorials

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Game-theoretic Aspects in Blockchain Environments

Aggelos Kiayias - University of Edinburgh, UK and Input Output Global (IOG)

Elias Koutsoupias - University of Oxford, UK

Evangelos Markakis - Athens University of Economics & Business, Greece and Input Output Global (IOG)

This tutorial proposal aims to provide an overview of game-theoretic and economic aspects arising in the design and analysis of blockchain protocols. In recent years, blockchain systems have emerged as a game-theoretic arena, fostering a wide range of economic interactions among their stakeholders. To provide some prominent examples, many protocols use auctions or other forms of mechanisms for determining the transactions to be included in a block. These mechanisms, whose purpose is to control congestion of transactions and to compensate the users for their resources, give rise to new research questions in mechanism design. As a second example, along a different dimension, the switch from Proof of Work to Proof of Stake systems has made it easier for all users to participate in the block production process via staking (i.e., by delegating their stake to the actual block validators of the protocol). This in turn has intensified the need for designing appropriate reward-sharing schemes, so that these collaborating entities can share their profits. Beyond such interactions, blockchain communities also envision themselves as self-governed distributed organizations, with their own governance systems. Governance in this context may refer both to elections over critical parameters of a protocol but also to elections for allocating treasury funds for improvement proposals (participatory budgeting). Setting up voting rules in this domain comes with its own challenges and incentive considerations, especially given the anonymity of the users. To this end, during the tutorial, we plan to present recent research and highlight open problems and new directions mainly on the following selected list of topics: 1) transaction fee mechanism design, regarding the analysis of policies for congestion control, 2) design and analysis of reward-sharing schemes, aiming at distributing rewards from block production to the players involved, and 3) governance in blockchain systems, concerning decision-making processes in decentralized autonomous organizations.

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Computation of Nash Equilibria: Recent Advances in Algorithms and Complexity

Argyrios Deligkas - Royal Holloway University of London, UK

Nash equilibrium is the standard solution concept in game theory since it provides pre- dictions for the behavior of interacting agents. One of the most fundamental problems in the field is to find a Nash equilibrium of a game. In this tutorial, we will cover the recent advances on the field both in terms of upper bounds and lower bounds. Partici- pants will learn the fundamental theory of two-player games and how to compute Nash equilibria in these games, will see several different kinds of many player games, and the computational challenges behind the computation of Nash equilibria.

The tutorial will cover several recent advancements on the topic of equilibrium computation. For upper bounds the tutorial will explain the recent results for bimatrix game that improved tha approximation ratios after 15 and 7 years respectively. Furthermore, will explain in detail the recently proposed framework of Pure-Circuit that has improved the accessibility and understanding on the topic and has made the derivation of strong PPAD-hardness (and in some cases tight) results much easier.

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Principal-Agent Decision-Making Processes: Modeling, Optimization, and Learning

Jiarui Gan - University of Oxford, UK

Jibang Wu - University of Chicago, USA

Haifeng Xu - University of Chicago, USA

The principal-agent problem is a well-established model in microeconomics that addresses challenges arising from misaligned interests and information in economic interactions. Over time, the model has evolved along with the increasing complexity of modern decision-making systems. There is growing interest in developing unified theories and computational techniques to solve these problems, with focuses on incentive structures, information asymmetry, as well as sophisticated real-world applications involving unknown or dynamic environments. This tutorial will provide both foundational and cutting-edge insights into the principal-agent problem, covering basic models, computational methods for optimization and learning, as well as practical applications in the areas of contract design, information design, and multi-agent reinforcement learning.

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Information Elicitation Meets Large Language Models: Progress, Opportunities, and Challenge

Yuxuan Lu - Peking University, China

Shengwei Xu - University of Michigan, USA

Eliciting high-quality information from the crowd has become increasingly important, with applications spanning data labeling, reputation systems, peer grading, and peer review. Incentive mechanisms have been proposed to motivate truthful and informative reports by rewarding them more than untruthful or uninformative reports, including scoring rules, peer prediction, and Bayesian Truth Serum. Provable theoretical guarantees have been achieved.

However, traditional approaches are limited to relatively simple report formats, such as probability forecasts or multiple-choice answers. Recent studies have expanded these techniques to the domain of text-based reports, leveraging advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs), which significantly increases the applicability of Information Elicitation mechanisms, especially in applications where textual feedback is common and highly informative, such as academic peer reviews, online business reviews, and social media comments. Moreover, recent studies also suggest that peer prediction mechanisms can be utilized to evaluate LLMs by assessing their ability to generate informative content.

In addition to these current developments, this tutorial will also introduce a practical toolkit that leverages cloud computing resources, Google Colab, to deploy and fine-tune open-source LLMs for information elicitation research. This toolkit is designed specifically for theorists and researchers who may not have access to significant computational resources (GPUs) or extensive experience with LLM coding.

Accepted Papers

Online Matching Meets Sampling Without Replacement
Zhiyi Huang, Chui Shan Lee, Jianqiao Lu, Xinkai Shu

Proportionally Representative Clustering
Jeremy Vollen, Haris Aziz, Barton E. Lee, Shosuke Xiang You Morota Chu

The Fairness of Maximum Nash Social Welfare Under Matroid Constraints and Beyond
Yuanyuan Wang, Xin Chen, Qingqin Nong

Optimism in the Face of Ambiguity Principle for Multi-Armed Bandits
Mengmeng Li, Daniel Kuhn, Bahar Taskesen

How much should you pay for restaking security?
Tarun Chitra, Mallesh Pai

Splitting Guarantees for Prophet Inequalities via Nonlinear Systems
Johannes Brustle, Sebastian Perez-Salazar, Victor Verdugo

Robust Optimal Selling Mechanism under Non-linear Utility
Pin Gao, Yicheng Liu, Shixin Wang, Zhen Wang, Zizhuo Wang

Simultaneous vs Sequential: Optimal Assortment Recommendation in Multi-Store Retailing
Xiao Chen, Yan Liu, Yicheng Liu, Zizhuo Wang

An Algorithmic Theory of Simplicity in Mechanism Design
Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre

Information Acquisition in Fragmented Markets
Xian Wu, Mengjia Xia

Strategic Facility Location via Predictions
Qingyun Chen, Nick Gravin, Sungjin Im

Enabling Asymptotic Truth Learning in a Social Network
Kevin Lu, Jordan Chong, Matt Lu, Jie Gao

When to Push Ads: Optimal Mobile Ad Campaign Strategy under Markov Customer Dynamics
Guokai Li, Pin Gao, Zizhuo Wang

LP-based Control for Network Revenue Management under Markovian Demands
Haixiang Lan, Guillermo Gallego, Zizhuo Wang, Yinyu Ye

Repeated Bidding with Dynamic Value
Benjamin Heymann, Alexandre Gilotte, Rémi Chan-Renous

Truthful Budget Aggregation: Beyond Moving-Phantom Mechanisms
Mark Berg, Rupert Freeman, Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin, Markus Utke

Interconnected Conflict
Marcin Konrad Dziubiński, Sanjeev Goyal, Junjie Zhou

Almost Envy-free Allocation of Indivisible Goods: A Tale of Two Valuations
Alireza Kaviani, Masoud Seddighin, AmirMohammad Shahrezaei

Ex-post Individually Rational Bayesian Persuasion
Jiahao Zhang, Shuran Zheng, Renato Paes Leme, Steven Wu

Computing Competitive Equilibrium for Chores: Linear Convergence and Lightweight Iteration
He Chen, Chonghe Jiang, Anthony Man-Cho So

Tree Splitting Based Rounding Scheme for Weighted Proportional Allocations with Subsidy
Xiaowei Wu, Shengwei Zhou

Gradual Matching with Affirmative Action
Kriti Manocha, Bertan Turhan

Churning While Experimenting: Maximizing User Engagement in Recommendation Platforms
Michael L Hamilton, Raghav Singal

Stochastic Online Metric Matching: Adversarial is no Harder than Stochastic
Amin Saberi, Mingwei Yang, Sophie H. Yu

Infrequent Resolving Algorithm for Online Linear Programming
Guokai Li, Zizhuo Wang, Jingwei Zhang

Fair and Almost Truthful Mechanisms for Additive Valuations and Beyond
Biaoshuai Tao, Mingwei Yang

A Computer-aided Approach for Approximate Nash Equilibria
Xiaotie Deng, Dongchen Li, Hanyu Li

Regulating Discriminatory Pricing in the Presence of Tacit Collusion
Zongsen Yang, Xiao Lei, Pin Gao

Logarithmic Comparison-Based Query Complexity for Fair Division of Indivisible Goods
Xiaolin Bu, Zihao Li, Shengxin Liu, Jiaxin Song, Biaoshuai Tao

Grace Period is All You Need: Individual Fairness without Revenue Loss in Revenue Management
Patrick Jaillet, Chara Podimata, Zijie Zhou

When Should you Offer an Upgrade: Online Upgrading Mechanisms for Resource Allocation
Patrick Jaillet, Chara Podimata, Andrew Vakhutinsky, Zijie Zhou

A Fair Allocation is Approximately Optimal for Indivisible Chores, or Is It?
Bo Li, Ankang Sun, Shiji Xing

How to Implement Soft Reserves in India: A Market Design Approach with Historical Perspective
Bertan Turhan, Orhan Aygun

Computing Most Equitable Voting Rules
Lirong Xia

Chinese High School Admissions under Affirmative Action Policies with Score Constraints
Umut Dur, Yanning Zhang

Beyond the worst case: Distortion in impartial culture electorates
Ioannis Caragiannis, Karl Fehrs

Proportional Dynamics in Linear Fisher Markets with Auto-bidding: Convergence, Incentives and Fairness
Juncheng Li, Pingzhong Tang

Data-Scarce Identification of Game Dynamics via Sum-of-Squares Optimization
Iosif Sakos, Antonios Varvitsiotis, Georgios Piliouras

Optimal Scoring Rule Design under Partial Knowledge
Yiling Chen, Fang-Yi Yu

The Impact of Generative Artificial Intelligence on Market Equilibrium: Evidence from a Natural Experiment
Kaichen Zhang, Zixuan Yuan, Hui Xiong

Best-of-Both-Worlds Fair Allocation of Indivisible and Mixed Goods
Xiaolin Bu, Zihao Li, Shengxin Liu, Xinhang Lu, Biaoshuai Tao

Generalized Principal-Agency: Contracts, Information, Games and Beyond
Jiarui Gan, Minbiao Han, Jibang Wu, Haifeng Xu

Continuous Social Networks
Julián Chitiva, Xavier Venel

Fair Interventions in Weighted Congestion Games
Miriam Fischer, Martin Gairing, Dario Paccagnan

Edge Arrival Online Matching: The Power of Free Disposal on Acyclic Graphs
Tianle Jiang, Yuhao Zhang

Fair Ordering in Replicated Systems via Streaming Social Choice
Geoffrey Ramseyer, Ashish Goel

Continuous-Time Best-Response and Related Dynamics in Tullock Contests with Convex Costs
Edith Elkind, Abheek Ghosh, Paul W. Goldberg

Mechanism Design with Delegated Bidding
Gagan Aggarwal, Marios Mertzanidis, Alexandros Psomas, Di Wang

Informational Size in School Choice
Di Feng, Yun Liu

Static Pricing for Online Selection Problem and its Variants
Bo Sun, Hossein Nekouyan Jazi, Xiaoqi Tan, Raouf Boutaba

Time-Efficient Algorithms for Nash-Bargaining-Based Matching Market Models
Ioannis Panageas, Thorben Tröbst, Vijay Vazirani

An impossibility result for strongly group-strategyproof multi-winner approval-based voting
Ioannis Caragiannis, Rob LeGrand, Evangelos Markakis, Emmanouil Pountourakis

When does additional information lead to longer travel time in multi-origin–destination networks?
Xujin Chen, Xiao-Dong Hu, Xinqi Jing, Zhongzheng Tang

Matching with Nested and Bundled Pandora Boxes
Robin Bowers, Bo Waggoner

Market Design for Capacity Sharing in Networks
Saurabh Amin, Patrick Jaillet, Haripriya Pulyassary, Manxi Wu

Auctioning with Strategically Reticent Bidders
Jibang Wu, Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, Haifeng Xu

Packing a Knapsack with Items Owned by Strategic Agents
Javier Cembrano, Max Klimm, Martin Knaack

Barter Exchange with Bounded Trading Cycles
Yuval Emek, Matan-El Shpiro

Optimal Guarantees for Online Selection Over Time
Sebastian Perez-Salazar, Victor Verdugo

The Complexity of Symmetric Bimatrix Games with Common Payoffs
Abheek Ghosh, Alexandros Hollender

Impartial Selection Under Combinatorial Constraints
Javier Cembrano, Max Klimm, Arturo Merino

Mechanism Design for Exchange Markets
Yusen Zheng, Yukun Cheng, Chenyang Xu, Xiaotie Deng

Pandora's Box Problem Over Time
Georgios Amanatidis, Federico Fusco, Rebecca Reiffenhäuser, Artem Tsikiridis

Price of Non-discrimination in Public Combinatorial Contracts
Yiding Feng, Mengfan Ma, Mingyu Xiao

Price Competition in Linear Fisher Markets: Stability, Equilibrium and Personalization
Juncheng Li, Pingzhong Tang

Aggregation of Antagonistic Contingent Preferences: When Is It Possible?
Ying Wang, Biaoshuai Tao, Xiaotie Deng

Convergence to Equilibrium of No-regret Dynamics in Congestion Games
Volkan Cevher, Wei Chen, Leello Dadi, Jing Dong, Ioannis Panageas, Stratis Skoulakis, Luca Viano, Baoxiang Wang, Siwei Wang

Programme

Programme Overview (Tentative!)

Local Information

Main Venue

The main conference venue is the School of Informatics of the University of Edinburgh.

Hotels

Please note: Edinburgh is a popular destination, especially in December. Therefore all conference attendees are strongly encouraged to make their travel arrangements as early as possible!

Participants can benefit from a discounted rate at these four hotels, which are affiliated with the University of Edinburgh, by using the code "EVENT".

• The Scott
• The Scholar
• KM Hotel
• KM Apartments

Notice, however, that availability is already limited, and may depend on the specific choice of days, and type of room.

Furthermore, here is a selection of hotels that are in close proximity to the main conference venue, and therefore might be of interest to potential conference participants:

• Hotel Du Vin
• Ten Hill Place
• Holiday Inn Royal Mile
• Ibis Edinburgh Centre South Bridge

Previous WINEs

• WINE 2023, Shanghai, China
• WINE 2022, Troy, USA
• WINE 2021, Potsdam, Germany
• WINE 2020, Beijing, China
• WINE 2019, New York, USA
• WINE 2018, Oxford, UK
• WINE 2017, Bangalore, India
• WINE 2016, Montreal, Canada
• WINE 2015, Amsterdam, Netherlands
• WINE 2014, Beijing, China
• WINE 2013, Harvard, USA
• WINE 2012, Liverpool, UK
• WINE 2011, Singapore
• WINE 2010, Stanford, USA
• WINE 2009, Rome, Italy
• WINE 2008, Shanghai, China
• WINE 2007, San Diego, USA
• WINE 2006, Patras, Greece
• WINE 2005, Hong Kong, China

AGT@Blockchains Workshop

We are happy to announce that, following the main WINE 2024 programme, a satelite workshop on game-theoretic aspects of blockchains will take place on Friday, December 6, 2024. The workshop is organized in collaboration with IOG.

All WINE 2024 attendees are welcome to participate! (free of charge)

The purpose of this one-day event is to bring together researchers in algorithmic game theory and distributed algorithms to investigate game theoretic problems in the field of blockchain protocols and distributed ledgers. More details to be announced soon.